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Abstract
Financial markets can be seen as complex systems that are constantly
evolving and sensitive to external disturbance, such as systemic risks and eco-
nomic instabilities. Analysis of resilient market performance, therefore, be-
comes useful for investors. From a systems perspective, this paper proposes
a novel function-based resilience metric that considers the effect of two fault-
tolerance thresholds: the Robustness Range (RR) and the Elasticity Threshold
(ET). We examined the consecutive resilience cycles and their dynamics in the
performance of two stock markets, NASDAQ and SSE. The proposed metric
was also compared with three well-documented resilience models. The results
showed that this new metric could satisfactorily quantify the time-varying re-
silience cycles in the multi-cycle volatile performance of stock markets while
also being more feasible in comparative analysis. Furthermore, analysis of
dynamics revealed that those consecutive resilience cycles in market perfor-
mance were distributed non-linearly, following a power-law behavior in the
upper tail. Finally, sensitivity tests demonstrated the large-value resilience cy-
cles were relatively sensitive to changes in RR. In practice, RR could indicate
investors’ psychological capability to withstand downturns. It supports the ob-
servation that perception on the market’s resilient responses may vary among
investors. This study provides a new tool and valuable insight for researchers,
practitioners, and investors when evaluating market performance.
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1 Introduction
The resilience of complex systems has been increasingly studied by policymak-
ers, practitioners, and researchers in recent years. However, resilience is often dif-
ferently perceived and interpreted in different disciplines (Fisher, 2015; Couzin-
Frankel, 2018). This has led to the introduction of various frameworks and metrics
that have proposed to understand and evaluate this emerging risk-related property
via quantitative or qualitative approaches (Bruneau and Reinhorn, 2006; Linkov
et al., 2013; Nan et al., 2014).
Stock markets can be seen as complex evolving systems that constantly un-
dergo uncertain and unexpected disturbance and risks (Kaueˆ Dal’Maso Peron et al.,
2012), causing frequent, volatile, and dynamic market responses. Therefore, per-
formance evaluations concerning factor analysis are not uncommon in stock market
research. For instance, the relationship between CEO ownership and stock market
performance (Lilienfeld-toal and Ruenzi, 2014) and the relationship between po-
litical risks and market equity returns (Lehkonen and Heimonen, 2015) have been
examined. Other factors also include Monetary policy (Galı´ and Gambetti, 2015),
environmental issues (Joo et al., 2017), and even the outcome of the US presidential
election (Pereira et al., 2018). However, evaluating resilient performance in stock
markets is missing in these studies.
Apart from those factor-related studies on general market performance, some
has focused on the stability and resilience of the markets. For example, Leal and
Napoletano (2017) studied the stability and resilience of low- and high-frequency
trading using agent-based models. They found that regulatory policies can tackle
volatility and flash crashes in market performance. Bookstaber et al. (2016) studied
the impact of decision cycles on overall market resilience and the stochastic fea-
tures of prices. Erragragui et al. (2018) investigated the effects of ethics in improv-
ing stock market resilience with instability. Drakos (2011) studied the diffusion
mechanism of terrorist shocks to third countries’ stock market responses.
Moreover, there is a research stream in assessing stock market resilience us-
ing methods of network science. In this vein, the complex market environment is
often represented as networks to study interesting traits, such as market structure
and resilience (Kaueˆ Dal’Maso Peron et al., 2012), individual stock’s survivability
resilience (Tang et al., 2017, 2018), and models for better managing networked mar-
kets (Farmer et al., 2012). This different vision of stock market analysis offers novel
insights into intractable questions, such as explaining why stock markets crash (Sor-
nette, 2004) and the temporal evolutionary process of financial systems (Zhao et al.,
2018). To our knowledge, the studies of stock market resilience using systems per-
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spectives are mainly focusing on this idea of “network proxy”, systems-oriented
approaches still need to be further developed.
In the broader community of economics system studies, Rose (2004) has at-
tempted to define several important dimensions of economic resilience to disasters
and has established a solid foundation for understanding economic resilience. Fur-
thermore, Rose (2007) has proposed a static resilience metric to define system re-
silience as the ratio of the avoided downturn in overall output and its maximum the-
oretical downturn. The difficulty in implementing this metric is that the unknown of
the estimation of expected post-event system performance (Hosseini et al., 2016).
Even so, this metric has been adapted by others for measuring macroscopic eco-
nomic resilience (Wein and Rose, 2011). Other excellent and well-acknowledged
contributions in the area of economic resilience have also been made by Duval et al.
(2007); Simmie and Martin (2010); Martin (2011), and Hill et al. (2012). However,
most of them are merely qualitative and policy-driven.
On the other hand, in the systems engineering community, the assessment of re-
silience has emerged with a different viewpoint. To measure system resilience under
seismic disturbances, Bruneau et al. (2003) have proposed a quantitative metric to
assess the “Resilience-Triangle” in a system’s time-series performance (Tierney and
Bruneau, 2007; Cimellaro et al., 2010). In particular, if one considers that the per-
formance of a system decreases after an external shock but recovers after a certain
length of time, then a very straightforward proxy for a system’s resilience loss is
the decline in performance, which is defined by: (1) failure process (measured from
the level of performance immediately before the shock to the lowest performance
after the shock), (2) the recovery process (from the lowest performance to the post-
event performance after the recovery), and (3) total time between the shock and
the end of the post-event recovery. A single successive process of this “failure and
recovery” is also referred to as one “resilience cycle.” This deterministic metric is
part of the so-called “R4” resilience framework, which delineates four functions:
Robustness, Redundancy, Resourcefulness, and Rapidity. It has inspired many
other performance-based metrics, such as those of Ouyang and Duen˜as-Osorio
(2012), Nan and Sansavini (2017) and Tang and Heinimann (2018). Here, readers
are recommended to refer additional review papers for further readings on system
resilience, including Bhamra et al. (2011); Martin-Breen and Anderies (2011); Cere
et al. (2017), and Rus et al. (2018).
To date, quantitative assessments of resilience can be roughly categorized as
general performance-based measures or structure-based models (Hosseini et al.,
2016). Metrics for general measures based on system-level performance are com-
monly developed as deterministic and probabilistic. This type of metrics usually re-
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quires full knowledge of a system’s time-series performance profile for subsequent
analysis. In this paper, the focus is on deterministic performance-based metrics for
measuring consecutive resilience cycles in stock markets. Because stock markets
can be viewed as systems, we would like to propose a new approach which adopts a
systems-oriented perspective to contribute to the body of knowledge in performance
evaluation of stock markets.
There are three evident gaps can be identified from literature review: (1) An
innovative coalition that combines systems-based resilience assessment with the
evaluation of stock market performance is still needed. (2) Because fault tolerance
is an important system attribute for resisting degradation and maintaining perfor-
mance (Gonza´lez et al., 1997), it should be intuitively incorporated into resilience
metrics. However, most well-established metrics have ignored the effects of the
tolerance capability, which is a top-level system capability to “tolerate downturns”
during shocks. And (3) the exploration of the dynamic features of consecutive re-
silience cycles in time-series market performance has been largely overlooked.
To bridge these gaps, this paper proposes a metric based on a comprehensive
resilience framework from a systems perspective, which ontologically identifies a
series of system-level elemental functions. The consideration of two system’s fault-
tolerance thresholds, Robustness Range (RR) and Elasticity Threshold (ET), was
quantitatively incorporated into the metric, and three existing metrics were selected
for comparison purpose. The empirical study was conducted by utilizing the daily
closing values of two stock market indexes: NASDAQ and SSE (Shanghai market
in China). Data were collected from open sources over a 5-year span, from 2013 to
2018.
To illustrate the merits of the metrics, the proposed and selected metrics were
tested in these two empirical cases. The dynamics of the consecutive resilience
cycles and the model sensitivity were demonstrated by analyzing distributions and
robustness analysis. Eventually, insights of resilient performance in the markets and
the effect of investors’ psychological perception on quantified resilience indicators
were remarked.
The main contributions of this paper are summarized as:
1. The paper proposes a novel and relatively better performance-based metric,
from a systems perspective, to quantify consecutive resilient responses in
stock markets, which considers the effects of a system’s capability of fault tol-
erance. This bridges one of the gaps in the literature and enriches the toolkit
for performance evaluation studies in financial markets.
2. The paper provides insights on the stochastic characters of time-varying re-
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silient behaviors in volatile market performance and draws inferences about
market resilience as well as investors’ psychological effects.
3. Because of the generality of this systems-oriented approach, the proposed
methodology could have high transferability to other fields of research and
contributes to broader scientific understanding about performance-based re-
silience.
In the upper half of this paper, we construct the resilience metric using a lan-
guage of systems science in Section 2-4, including terminologies and viewpoints.
Evidence related to financial stock markets is given where it is necessary for clar-
ification. In the second half, Section 5-6, we demonstrate the applicability of the
proposed metric by empirically studying the market resilience in the selected mar-
ket cases, and conduct dynamics analysis and sensitivity tests. Finally, we end this
paper by summarizing the main findings.
2 Function-based resilience framework
Recent research by Heinimann and Hatfield (2017) has framed and defined re-
silience in terms of transferable functions by following the “Structure-System”
paradigm of systems engineering and providing a comprehensive multi-dimensional
consideration (Fig 1). Let us briefly explain this framework. The biophysical func-
tions of a system’s resilient behavior include resistance, re-stabilization of critical
performance, and the rebuilding and reconfiguration of that performance. Secondly,
from the perspective of a socio-technical system, cognitive resilience must fea-
ture awareness, anticipation, remembrance of useful action, learning, and adapting.
Finally, resilience can then be incorporated into long-term macroscopic enabling
properties, with the goal of coping with the changing environment and preventing
degradation in the long run.
Because the scope of the paper is focusing on performance-based assessments of
microscopic resilience cycles and does not involve any cognitive study, we adopted
those biophysical functions as the applied framework for pragmatic considerations
in general (Heinimann and Hatfield, 2017).
Biophysical functions provide an aggregated characterization of a single “re-
silience cycle” (or “bathtub” shape) in typical system performance. This particular
shape can be triggered by a shock (either external or internal), followed by imme-
diate absorption and post-event reaction by the system that includes the abilities to
restore and adapt (Biringer et al., 2016). The framework assigns these responsive
capabilities as broader concepts, e.g., the capability to resist, re-stabilize, rebuild
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Cognitive	Functions	
Cope	
with	
Prevent	
degradation	
Stay	
aware	
Anticipate	
Remember	
Adapt	
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configure	
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Re-
stabilize	
Resist	
Figure 1: Reconstructed resilience framework with three classes of functions.
Adapted from Heinimann and Hatfield (2017).
and re-configure, which then questions our understanding of a system’s behavior
as:
• Resist: How is the system’s ability to resist the negative effect of the shock on
its performance? This function acts as an aggregated outcome of a system’s
overall ability to resist and should include all sources of resisting efforts, such
as the ability to be robust, ability to actively prevent disturbance, and ability
to maintain stability, etc.
• Re-stabilize: Can the system respond to a shock by stabilizing its perfor-
mance, and how much effort is needed to regain or maintain this post-event
stability? This function describes the system’s ability to stabilize the level
of functionality so that the adverse effects caused by disturbances would not
fatally compromise the system.
• Rebuild: Once the performance is stabilized and total collapse prevented,
how can the system rebuild its performance after the shock? This function
is essential because there would be minimal room to discuss resilience if the
systems do not acquire the ability to rebuild its performance afterward.
• Re-configure: After surviving the shock, how can the system’s overall perfor-
mance be re-organized and updated? In this way, the adaptive behavior would
be possible, and the overall system would be more resilient than before.
In this paper, these four biophysical functions were termed as “elemental func-
tions” (resistance, re-stabilization, rebuilding, and re-configuration) because they
are the key characteristics of a system’s resilient response during a disruption event.
From the perspective of system performance, they crystallize the system states from
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“pre-event” via “during-event” to “post-event” according to the original frame-
work.1
3 Tolerance thresholds
Primarily described as a generic system character in systems engineering, fault tol-
erance – the ability of a system to continue its operation with acceptable perfor-
mance in an event that some of its performance is compromized (Gonza´lez et al.,
1997) – also plays an indispensable role in sculpting system resilience. Here, two
thresholds can be defined which contribute to general tolerance capability of a sys-
tem, Robustness Range (RR) and Elasticity Threshold (ET). These thresholds rep-
resent two levels of tolerance.
First level: RR acts as the first level of tolerance, where the compromise is not
fatal. As described, this threshold depicts a “system’s ability to maintain its perfor-
mance within an acceptable range of degradation” (Haimes, 2009). Therefore, as
long as performance is maintained within the RR, it is considered acceptable. In
other words, this level of tolerance represents the system’s capability to withstand
and resist the negative effects of disturbances. More importantly, this concept is
generic across stock markets. For example, stock market indexes incorporate an
intuitive “safe range” so that investors can perceive attentive losses or gains that fall
outside of this range (Johansen et al., 2010; Filimonov and Sornette, 2015)2.
Second level: Similar to the concept of “Elasticity” in the field of mechanics,
a lower threshold, ET, should also be incorporated to denote phase shifts in per-
formance states. This is the second level of fault tolerance which can be seen as
the last “defense line” where the downturn of a system’s performance could still
be tolerable to some extent. If the performance dropped below this threshold, it is
assumed that this phase transition (or de-stabilization) would cost significant efforts
and time for a system to regain its performance. For instance, financial stock mar-
kets can experience well-documented regime shifts due to unexpected disturbances,
e.g., financial crashes (Kaizoji, 2000; Wilin´ski et al., 2013)3.
Fig 2 illustrates an ontological relationship between these two thresholds and
the elemental functions established in the previous section. The tolerance thresh-
1It is important to note that this framework of resilience, including these elemental functions,
may not be universally accepted by different researchers. As described in Section 1, the exact frame-
work of system resilience is a controversial topic. Here, we adopted this framework because of its
comprehensiveness and generality.
2This could also be true in other systems. For example, water distribution systems have high-
and low-pressure boundaries that confine a robustness range in order to maintain acceptable func-
tionality (Hashimoto et al., 1982).
3Some other social and engineering systems are also known to have similar phase transition
phenomena (Kacperski and Holyst, 1996), such as transportation systems and social networks.
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olds influence the elemental functions of a system and, consequently, its resilience.
Therefore, those thresholds should be incorporated into the process of measuring
resilient responses.
System	
Resilience	
Elemental	
Functions	
1st	layer:	acceptable	
degradation	boundary:	
Robustness	
Range	
2nd	layer:	threshold	
of	phase	transition:	
Elasticity	Threshold	
Resistance	
Re-stabilization	
Rebuilding	
Reconfiguration	
Tolerance	
Thresholds	
Figure 2: System resilience decomposed as fault tolerance and elemental functions.
Notes: black arrows indicate ontological interdependence or ”contribute-to” rela-
tionships; dotted arrow, interactive effect between tolerance thresholds and elemen-
tal functions.
4 Metric construction
This section presents the quantification of functions and thresholds to form the pro-
posed metric. Firstly, some general assumptions are necessary: (1) Assume that
a shock happens at time tpre with the level of performance (LoP) at P(tpre), the
point at which the downturn/failure process starts (red area in Fig. 3), and the sys-
tem’s LoP begins to decrease. At time tevent , the LoP would reach its minimum
level at P(tevent), which then initiates the upturn/recovery segment (green area in
Fig. 3). The recovery would eventually complete at time tpost with a post-event
performance of P(tpost); And (2) Discussions on shock features, such as sources,
intensities, forms, etc., are not in the scope of this paper, we simply symbolized
“shocks” as a general outcome of stimuli and disturbance that could reflect on the
overall performance in a broader sense.
A multi-cycle hybrid performance (MCHP) contains a series of resilience cycles
with a mixed combination of different types of post-event performance. The over-
all system-level performance of a stock market can be represented as a time-series
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evolving index, which can be seen as a concrete example of MCHP. Fig 3 presents
four possible post-event performance that can be widely observed in a typical re-
silience cycle (Heinimann, 2016). They can be outlined as follows:
• Collapse: This type of P(tpost) is equivalent to “worst-case recovery” or “no
recovery,” which represents a situation in which a system’s performance can-
not organize any form of effective recovery after the shock. Here, notice that
the term “Collapse” did not necessarily indicate physical damages, but rather
served as a representation of “collapse of LoP”;
• Insufficient: As is self-evident, this type of P(tpost) indicates a partial recovery
when compared with P(tpre), such that P(tpre) > P(tpost);
• Leveled: This is the most widely studied paradigm in the field of resilience,
and is used to describe the case at which performance loss is fully restored at
P(tpost);
• Adaptive: Learning and adapting behaviors are pervasive in some highly
evolving (e.g., complex adaptive and intelligent systems) or volatile systems
(such as stock markets). Such systems often foster cases in which P(tpost)
exceeds the level of P(tpre) to promote growth in overall performance.
Level of Performance 
(LoP) P(t)  
Time 
Shock Adaptive 
Leveled 
Insufficient 
Collapse 
tpost tevent tpre 
P(tevent) 
P(tpre) 
Robustness 
Range 
Elasticity 
Threshold 
P(tpost) 
 RR = ± PRR 
ET = PET × P(tpre)  
 Rm 
Failure 
Process 
Recovery 
Process 
Figure 3: Example of resilience cycle associated with 4 types of post-event perfor-
mance.
4.1 Characterization of tolerance thresholds
Based on this outline of the possible post-event performance in a resilience cycle,
the tolerance thresholds can then be defined as follows:
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Robustness Range (RR): The wider the RR, the more resilient the performance.
During the process of calculations, the range is computed as a percentage, PRR, and
is expressed as:
RR =±PRR (1)
Elasticity Threshold (ET ): If LoP falls below the ET (when the phase transition
occurs), then extra efforts may be needed to help the system re-gain its LoP. It can
be expressed as a certain percentage, PET , of the P(tpre) in a resilience cycle.
ET = PET ×P(tpre) (2)
4.2 Quantification of elemental functions
Once the tolerance thresholds were set, the elemental functions can be quantified
accordingly as follows:
Resistance (Rm): Resistance should be a total measure of the capability to re-
sist the negative impact caused by a disturbance with the capability to maintain the
LoP immediately after that occurrence. It is an aggregated outcome of system’s
overall ability to prevent negative effects of shocks, which could be approximated
as the minimum LoP P(tevent) during the entire process from tpre to tpost (Nan and
Sansavini, 2017) plus the maintaining effects contributed from the robustness range.
This measure identifies the maximum impact of disruptive events, and use the re-
maining capacities as a proxy for the system’s current ability to resist.
Rm = P(tevent)+RR f or t ∈ [tpre, tpost ] (3)
Re-stabilization (Re): This function determines the need to regain stability when
a phase transition occurs in performance. Intuitively, if the level drops below ET
(assuming that the transition happens when LoP falls below ET), then the need for
Re would be considered large because more stability has been lost after disruptive
events. Therefore, a high Re should indicate low resilience and 1−Re would denote
the remaining available stabilizing capacity. If the minimum point of LoP was above
ET, it is assumed that its Re shall be zero. Hence:
Re =
ET −P(tevent)
P(tpre)−P(tevent) i f ET > min[P(t)] (4)
Rebuilding (Rd): The relative rapidity of the entire recovery process is consid-
ered a sensible measure for assessing and quantifying the rebuilding function in a
resilience cycle. A quick recovery process means that the system is adequate to
re-organize, rearrange, and re-establish. As defined by Nan and Sansavini (2017),
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let S f and Sr represent the rapidity in downturn and upturn processes, respectively,
then the rebuilding capability is measured as:
Rd =
Sr
S f
(5)
where,
S f =
P(tpre)−P(tevent)
tevent− tpre and Sr =
P(tpost)−P(tevent)
tpost− tevent (6)
Reconfiguration (Rs): This attribute is sometimes labeled as the “Recovery sce-
narios” (Tang and Heinimann, 2018) or “Recovery path” in previous studies (Nan
and Sansavini, 2017). Nevertheless, this term essentially characterizes various re-
configuration results after a recovery. It can be defined, straightforward, as follows:
Rs =
P(tpost)−P(tevent)
P(tpre)−P(tevent) (7)
where, P(tpost)−P(tevent) is the LoP restoration during the recovery process and
P(tpre)−P(tevent) is the LoP loss in the failure process.
4.3 The proposed metric
After defining and quantifying all of these elemental functions accordingly, we ex-
pressed the proposed metric for offering a resilience indicator (RI) in each resilience
cycle as:
RI(t) = f (Rm,1−Re,Rd,Rs) = Rm× (1−Re)×Rd×Rs (8)
The rationale of this function-based metric is explained in several steps. First,
a multiplicative form was designed to avoid casual bias because the weight of each
function is often unobtainable. Second, resilience should intuitively be proportional
to the resistance capability, i.e., a larger Rm would denote a larger RI. Third, in
the case of recovery per unit time, Sr, is larger than the loss/failure per unit time
S f . Therefore, system performance should exhibit resilient behavior due to a rapid
rebuilding of the LoP. This would then lead to a larger RI value. Fourth, if min-
imum performance was below ET, then (1−Re) represents the available capacity
for stabilizing performance during the phase transition. Finally, Rs differentiates
various post-event cases where the value for adaptive behavior would be larger than
that calculated for other types of recovery, such that the following order occurred:
“Adaptive” > “Leveled” > “Insufficient” > “Collapse.”
The metric is supposed to be dimensionless (after normalization), and non-
negative whose value will be zero in the following cases: (1) there is no recovery
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(i.e., a collapsed case), meaning that both Sr and Rs are zero and system perfor-
mance either shows no resilience to cope with a shock or the LoP is stabilized at
the lowest point and never re-bounce; (2) given that the lowest point of LoP reaches
zero, i.e., Rm and (1−Re) are zero. Meanwhile, it may only take a second to realize
that this metric could be mathematically correct if and only if the downturn process
existed, that is, the S f is not zero, so that Rd and Rs would each have a non-zero
denominator.
4.4 Selected metrics for comparison
Three well-established resilience metrics are selected for comparison exercises. The
selection criteria were based on their characteristics and popularity.
The first metric, R1, was the “Resilience-Triangle” metric proposed by Bruneau
et al. (2003) as described in the Section 1. It depicts the total loss of system re-
silience based on the difference in area between 100% functionality and the actual
performance Q(t). Because it is characterized by the triangular area of performance
loss, its value should always be greater than zero. Given that Q(t) is the actual LoP
at time t, t0 is the tpre, and t1 is the tpost , then R1 is expressed as:
R1 =
∫ t1
t0
[100−Q(t)]dt (9)
The second metric, R2, was firstly proposed by Ouyang and Duen˜as-Osorio
(2012). Although its very essence is similar to R1, modifications have been made
to the representation of resilience. This metric confines its domain range from zero
to one as a ratio between the target (normally 100% LoP) and the actual LoP. The
expectation sign in its original computational form, as shown, is designed to obtain
the overall expected value of a series of resilience cycles.
R2 = E[
∫ T
0 P(t)dt∫ T
0 T P(t)dt
] (10)
where, T is the total time of observation, P(t) is the actual LoP at time t, and T P(t)
is the target LoP at time t.
The third metric R3 was initially presented by Francis and Bekera (2014). It is
not an “area-based” metric in which one considers the rate of recovery and LoP at
critical points are considered. Similar to the proposed metric, it depicts resilience
with various post-event performance and is a deterministic metric that can capture
adaptive behaviors.
R3 = Sp× FrF0 ×
Fd
F0
(11)
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where, Sp is the speed of recovery, Fr is the LoP after recovery, F0 is the LoP before
a disaster, and Fd is the lowest point of LoP.
5 Empirical study
This section presents a step-by-step empirical study of the proposed metric in the
time-series performance of two stock market indexes, NASDAQ and SSE. First step:
data collection, normalization, and de-noizing are introduced. Second step: initial
settings, such as identification of consecutive resilience cycles and determination of
tolerance thresholds, are presented. Third step: quantification results and compar-
ative analysis are demonstrated, and we comment on the performance of different
metrics in both study cases. Finally, we analyze the dynamics of the quantified
resilience cycles and explore the metric’s robustness in sensitivity tests.
5.1 Data description and pre-processing
The empirical data are daily closing values of the NASDAQ Composite Index (IN-
DEXNASDAQ:.IXIC) and SSE Composite Index (SHA: 000001), collected from
Yahoo Finance (Yahoo, 2018) with a specific period from 16 September 2013 to 16
April 2018. The time-series performance of a stock market would be an excellent
example for multi-cycle cases with hybrid post-event performance.
In general, a common platform for evaluating LoP is a normalized range be-
tween zero and one (Nan and Sansavini, 2017). Therefore, the pre-processing step
begin by normalizing the market performance index so that the LoP (y-axis) could
be confined to the range [0,1]. In this way, it facilitates the comparison between dif-
ferent metrics as well. Here, given a LoP, P(ti), at time ti and conducting a simple
statistical normalization, the normalized LoP can be expressed as P(ti)/max[P(t)].
Normalization of the x-axis was done by using a daily interval as the normalized
x-axis.
For a volatile performance in a stock market, measurements can be sensitive
to background noise (Filimonov and Sornette, 2015). Therefore, we applied the
“rlowess” algorithm in the Matlab toolbox (Mathworks, 2016), a robust version of
a local regression using weighted linear least squares and a first-order polynomial
model, to de-noise the performance data with a window span of four days. Tak-
ing the NASDAQ as an illustrative example, the normalized and de-noised index
performance is shown in Fig 4 (a).
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Figure 4: De-noised data and identification of cycles. (a) original data and de-noised
result smoothed by “rlowess” algorithm. (b) identified resilience cycles (black shad-
ing, drawups; white shading, drawdowns).
5.2 Initial settings
Implementing metrics requires one to identify, in advance, meaningful “up-and-
down” resilience cycles in the market performance (Johansen and Sornette, 1998,
2000). To address this, Johansen et al. (2010) have developed a straightforward
filtering algorithm, called τ−filter. Essentially, if the LoP drops successively for
fewer than τ days, then this drawdown can be neglected as a minor fluctuation.
Simply put, this filtering process cleans out meaningless cycles by observing their
duration. Here, τ was set as three days, so that any drawdown or drawup that lasted
less than three days would be merged with its neighbor portion. The final identifi-
cation outcome of resilience cycles in the NASDAQ over five years of observation
is presented in Fig 4 (b) (with black drawups and white drawdowns).
The practical RR and ET for each resilience cycle were initially determined as
0.01% and 80%, respectively. As suggested by Filimonov and Sornette (2015) and
Johansen et al. (2010), investors could be insensitive to any return fluctuation of
0.01% but will probably be hurt, either financially or psychologically, by a decline
of 40%. We assumed that half of this empirical value would cause a phase transition,
therefore ET = 1 - 20% = 80%.
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5.3 Quantification and comparative analysis
Fig 5 presents the quantification outcomes from the NASDAQ case, with subplot (a)
showing normalized performance and (b-e) exhibiting the results from RI, R1, R2,
and R3, respectively (readers can refer Appendix A for a detailed illustrative ex-
ample on how to implement the proposed metric. The implementation procedures
of selected metrics are documented in the corresponding literature as cited in the
previous section). Upon cross-referencing with the first 10 numerical values in Ta-
ble 1, one can see from the figure that RI provided not only appropriate scores but
also outperformed other metrics by assigning larger scores to continuous increasing
portions (see indicators in the highlighted segment). Most importantly, RI quanti-
fied the resilient performance of the market in an intuitively appropriate way. For
example, it is obvious that the overall trend of the highlighted segment is more re-
silient because of NASDAQ’s continuous and strong adaptive performance during
that period. Whereas this was well-captured by the proposed metric, the others ei-
ther failed to indicate such time-varying information (Subplot (c) and (e) for R1 and
R3) or else led to a wrong interpretation (roughly equal indicators shown in Subplot
(d) for R2).
Table 1: First 10 resilience indicators obtained by all four tested metrics
No. of Cycle NASDAQ SSE
RI R1 R2 R3 RI R1 R2 R3
1 1.23 0.00 1.00 0.0009 0.51 0.02 0.99 0.0023
2 0.82 -0.07 1.01 0.0023 0.04 0.14 0.98 0.0010
3 0.16 0.01 1.00 0.0005 2.23 -0.10 1.01 0.0018
4 6.84 0.00 1.00 0.0017 0.15 0.97 0.93 0.0025
5 1.88 -0.01 1.00 0.0022 18.33 -0.09 1.02 0.0017
6 2.06 0.00 1.00 0.0012 0.06 0.09 0.97 0.0017
7 1.11 0.00 1.00 0.0024 0.22 0.10 0.98 0.0012
8 2.54 -0.03 1.00 0.0011 2.49 -0.01 1.00 0.0023
9 0.76 0.13 0.99 0.0021 0.22 0.29 0.96 0.0022
10 0.48 0.06 0.99 0.0024 0.18 0.05 0.99 0.0008
Moreover, the results obtained from R1 and R2 were false. By merely setting
the targeted LoP (post-event status) at 100% of the pre-event level as described, it is
obvious that such a consideration was ill-fitted to adaptive performance. The indi-
cators calculated by R1 showed negative values that conflicted with its value range
[0, ∞] (highlighted in red circle). In addition, the result from R2 contained scores
greater than one, which also failed to meet its requirement of [0,1] (highlighted in
red line). In subplot (e), R3 did demonstrate some merits with adaptive recovery as
it lacked any fatal mistakes. However, because of its small value range and failure to
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Figure 5: Results from comparisons among four tested metrics, based on the NAS-
DAQ case. (a) normalised LoP, (b) RI, (c) R1, (d) R2, and (e) R3. Obvious defects
are highlighted in red. Indicators are plotted at the tevent in each cycle.
differentiate strong resilient behaviors from other cycles, its quantification strength
was still unpromising.
Similar observations can be found in the SSE case (Fig 6). There, SSE be-
haved quite differently than had the NASDAQ during the same period. A major
market bubble in the SSE market was also identified according to historical re-
ports (Riley and Yan, 2015) during this period. From the quantification results of
the proposed metric (subplot (b)), one can see that, prior to the bubble burst, market
performance had several strong resilient behaviors as revealed by relatively high
resilience scores during that highlighted period. However, after the burst, the fol-
lowing scores dropped dramatically, which correctly indicated a flattened LoP in
the overall trend.
5.4 Dynamics of resilience cycles
Distribution of the quantified resilience cycles can reveal their dynamic features.
Rank-size plots were firstly used to visually identify the empirical distribution of the
quantified outcomes, fitted to a theoretical power-law distribution. Secondly, their
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Figure 6: Results from comparisons among four tested metrics, based on the SSE
case. (a) normalised LoP, (b) RI, (c) R1, (d) R2, and (e) R3. Obvious defects are
highlighted in red. Indicators are plotted at the tevent in each cycle.
exceedance probabilities were calculated and plotted in a probability-size graph
with log-log scale (log(P(xi))vs. log(xi)) to check the power-law distribution in
the upper tail. Finally, the goodness-of-fit tests were conducted by applying the
Kolmogorov-Smirnov (K-S) test based on bootstrap re-sampling for 1000 reps to
obtain a mean p values. The p values from both cases were used to examine the
null hypothesis H0: the data follows a power-law distribution. In this case, the H0
can be rejected with the 0.05 level of significance if p value is < 0.05.
Figure 7 shows the results of the analysis for both NASDAQ and SSE. Subplot
(a) and (d) are rank-size plots of empirical distributions fitted to theoretical power-
law distributions, (b) and (e) are log-log plots for fitting the power-law distribution
in the upper tail, and (c) and (f) present bootstrap re-sampling results on p values.
As seen in the rank-size and probability-size plots, the empirical resilience indica-
tors of consecutive cycles in both cases could be approximated with a power-law
distribution in the upper tail. This is especially true in subplot (e), where the model
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Figure 7: (a) Rank-size plots of the quantified resilience cycles for NASDAQ case.
(b) Log-log size-probability plots of the quantified resilience cycles for NASDAQ
case, with the inner plot showing specific power-law fit to the tail section. (c) p
values of the K-S test with 1000 bootstrap re-sampling test, note that the mean
value is above 0.05 significance level. (d-f) corresponding plots for the SSE case.
provided an excellent fit in the upper tail of the SSE case and only slight deviance in
the NASDAQ case. The mean p values obtained from bootstrap K-S tests granted
the findings since both cases had a p value > 0.05, meaning we shall accept the
null hypothesis at the significance level of 0.05. For both cases, the power-law
distribution and the fat-tail feature indicated a non-trivial dynamics and a strongly
stochastic and volatile character in their consecutive resilience cycles.
5.5 Sensitivity tests
In this section, the sensitivity test on tolerance thresholds represents a robustness
check on the proposed metric, with respect to various levels of investors’ psycho-
logical capabilities to withstand performance downturns.
Fig 8 shows the sensitivity analysis of resilience indicators as it pertained to
these two parameters. For the NASDAQ case, subplot (a) in this figure shows the
analysis of RR varying from 0.01% to 0.2% with an incremental step of 0.01%.
Furthermore, subplot (b) presents results from the analysis of ET, covering the full
range (from 0% to 100%) at 1% increments each time with a narrower test range as
shown in the inner plot. Subplots (c) and (d) provides the corresponding results for
the SSE case. As seen in subplots (a) and (c), the overall performance of the metric
was robust to changes in both RR and ET. However, the quantified RI values were
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relatively sensitive to RR. Cycles with large RI scores were relatively sensitive to
RR variations when compared to those with small scores. This implies that percep-
tions of strong resilient cycles may vary in investors due to different psychological
capabilities to withstand downturns.
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70
Rank
0
20
40
60
80
100
120
140
160
180
Si
ze
0 20 40 600
20
40
60
80
100
120
140
160
180
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70
Rank
0
20
40
60
80
100
120
140
160
180
Si
ze
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70
Rank
0
20
40
60
80
100
120
140
160
180
Si
ze
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70
Descending RI
0
50
100
150
200
250
300
350
400
450
500
Va
lu
e 
of
 R
I
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70
0
50
100
150
200
250
300
350
400
450
500
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70
Descending RI
0
50
100
150
200
250
300
350
400
450
500
Va
lu
e 
of
 R
I
(a)$ (b)$RR$0.01%$~$0.2%$
δ$=$0.01%$
$
ET$0%$~$1%,$δ$=$1%$$
ET$99%$~$100%$
δ$=$0.1%$$
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70
Rank
0
20
40
60
80
100
120
140
160
180
Si
ze
ET = 0% ~ 100%, δ= 1%  
0 20 40 600
50
100
150
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70
Descending RI
0
50
100
150
200
250
300
350
400
450
500
Va
lu
e 
of
 R
I
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70
0
50
100
150
200
250
300
350
400
450
500
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70
Descending RI
0
50
100
150
200
250
300
350
400
450
500
Va
lu
e 
of
 R
I
(a)$ (b)$RR$0.01%$~$0.2%$
δ$=$0.01%$
$
ET$0%$~$1%,$δ$=$1%$$
ET$99%$~$100%$
δ$=$0.1%$$
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70
Descending RI
0
50
100
150
200
250
300
350
400
450
500
Va
lu
e 
of
 R
I
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70
0
50
100
150
200
250
300
350
400
450
500
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70
Descending RI
0
50
100
150
200
250
300
350
400
450
500
Va
lu
e 
of
 R
I
(a)$ (b)$RR$0.01%$~$0.2%$
δ$=$0.01%$
$
ET$0%$~$1%,$δ$=$1%$$
ET$99%$~$100%$
δ$=$0.1%$$
ET = 0% ~ 100%, δ= 1%  
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70
Descending RI
0
50
100
150
200
250
300
350
400
450
500
Va
lu
e 
of
 R
I
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70
0
50
100
150
200
250
300
350
400
450
500
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70
Descending RI
0
50
100
150
200
250
300
350
400
450
500
Va
lu
e 
of
 R
I
(a)$ (b)$RR$0.01%$~$0.2%$
δ$=$0.01%$
$
ET$0%$~$1%,$δ$=$1%$$
ET$99%$~$100%$
δ$=$0.1%$$
(a) 
(c) 
(b) 
(d) 
Figure 8: Sensitivity tests for RR and ET. (a) changes in RI values as RR moved
from 0.01% to 0.20% (0.01% increments). (b) changes in RI values as ET was
adjusted from 0% to 100% (1% increments). Inner plot: micro (0.1%) steps from
99% to 100%. Note that the y-axes of (c) and (d) were limited to 180, same as (a)
and (b), for a clear cross-comparison.
In contrast, the quantification results tended to be rather insensitive to changes
in ET, as shown in subplots (b) and (d). As can be seen, RI values remained rel-
atively stable until they suddenly became zeros once ET reached 100% (i.e., no
capacity was above ET, which meant that Re = 1 for all cycles). The term 1 - Re
began to vary until ET = 0.99 (inner plot of Fig 8 (b)). Similar features can also
be found in SSE case as shown in subplot(d). These results imply that ET had
very limited influence on the final RI values in this case study. Indeed, in most of
the resilience cycles, the ET was rarely greater than min[P(t)] because a strongly
adaptive and continuously augmented market performance would prevent possible
phase transitions. Nevertheless, once the ET was set large enough to allow for a
phase transition in most cycles, RI values began to show sensitivity to small varia-
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tions in ET. In practice, this could imply that large market crashes are rare (such as
“black swan” or “dragon king” events), but they would significantly alter investors’
perception on market resilience when they do occur.
6 Conclusions
This paper proposes a comprehensive function-based resilience metric that takes
two fault-tolerance thresholds into account, Robustness Range and Elasticity Thresh-
old, and compare it with three well-established metrics. By taking the time-series
performance of two stock markets as empirical studies, this paper studies the ap-
plicability of the proposed metric and the dynamics of time-varying resilience in
stock market performance while also looking at the effects of tolerance thresholds
in investors. The conclusions are summarized as follows:
• The proposed metric demonstrate satisfactory capability in quantifying time-
varying resilience cycles in stock market performance, and it outperforms
three well-established metrics in the comparative analysis of applicability.
• Analysis of distribution shows a strong stochastic character in the dynamics
of resilience cycles as quantified by the proposed metric. Here, a power-law
distribution is featured in the upper tail based on five years of performance
for both tested markets.
• Sensitivity tests of two tolerance thresholds reveal that the consideration of
these two parameters in resilience metric is essential. Even though the pro-
posed metric is, overall, robust to the tuning, large-value resilience cycles are
relatively sensitive to RR. In practice, RR represents investors’ psychological
capability to perceive meaningful downturns. Therefore, the results support
that perceptions on market’s resilient response could vary among investors.
The findings of this paper contribute to our understanding about financial market
resilience and explore the effects of tolerance capability on investors’ perceptions
of the market’s resilient response. By taking stock markets as systems, the approach
of this paper enriches the resilience assessment toolbox and provides an alternative
perspective for interpreting market resilience. The future studies can explore the
quantitative assessment of resilient responses in other markets.
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Appendix A: Implementation procedure for the proposed met-
ric
For clarification, an illustrative example of how this proposed metric can be imple-
mented in each identified cycle is provided. Fig 9 presents a typical drawdown-and-
drawup cycle under the “Leveled recovery” scenario. Given that the PET and PRR
are 50% and 1%, respectively.
Time%
RR"="0.02"
RG’%
0.1%
0.4%
0.2%
0.6%
0%
1%
ET%=%0.2%%
P(tpre)%=%%
LOP%% Given%that:%ET%=%0.450%%=%0.2,%%
and%RR%=%0.02%%
P(tpost)%=%%
P(tevent)%=%%
Shock%
Figure 9: A typical down-up cycle associated with the “Leveled recovery” scenario
(values not to scale). (Color is not needed)
1. Equation (3.1-3.2): ET is calculated as PET × P(tpre) = 0.4× 50% = 0.2.
Also, RR = ±1% = 0.02
2. Equation (3.3): Resistance Rm = 0.1+0.02 = 0.12
3. Equation (3.4): Re-stabilization Because ET >min[P(t)], Re = 0.2−0.10.2 = 0.5
4. Equation (3.5-3.6): Rebuilding S f = 0.4−0.12−1 = 0.3 and Sr =
0.4−0.1
5−2 = 0.1.
Thus, Rd = 0.10.3 = 0.333.
5. Equation (3.7): Reconfiguration Rs = 0.30.3 = 1 for “Just recovery” scenario.
6. Thus, Equation (3.8): RI = 0.12× (1−0.5)×0.333×1 = 0.020 for this ex-
ample
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